JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., Chief Judge.
Getting drunk and acting out is not, by itself, a crime. Ronald Eaton claims he was arrested, incarcerated, and beaten for just that, and accordingly, he seeks damages against Hancock County and the County employees he claims were responsible. In a careful and well-researched decision, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny most of the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. After both the County Defendants and Mr. Eaton objected, the Court performed a de novo review and concludes that the Magistrate Judge was correct.
On October 29, 2008, Ronald Eaton filed a complaint against Hancock County and other governmental and individual defendants claiming damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained during an arrest and detention. Compl. at ¶¶ 34-64 (Docket # 1). The Complaint contains eight counts undifferentiated among the Defendants: 1) Count One—a Fourth Amendment violation; 2) Count Two—Assault,
On November 30, 2009, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts.
On May 14, 2010, Mr. Eaton and Deputy Jason Lepper each objected to the Recommended Decision. Pl.'s Obj. to the Magistrate's Recommended Dec. and Req. for De Novo Review (Docket # 141) Pl.'s Obj.; Def. Jason Lepper's Partial Obj. to Recommended Dec. on Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket #142) (Def.'s Obj.). Mr. Eaton objected to the recommended dismissal of Hancock County, the Hancock County Sheriff's Department, William Clark, and Carl Dannenberg under the theory of governmental immunity and of Crystal Hobbs and Heather Sullivan on the conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
At 5 p.m. on November 5, 2006, Ronald Eaton arrived with his girlfriend, Cindy Furrow, at the China Hill Restaurant ("China Hill") in Ellsworth, Maine. Defs.' Hancock Cnty., Hancock Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, William Clark, Jason Lepper, Ryan Haines, Heather Sullivan, Joshua Gunn, Crystal Hobbs, Carl Dannenberg, Robert Morang, and John Weaver's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 51, 52 (Docket # 83) (DSMF); Pl.'s Reply to Defs.' Statement of Material Facts, Req. to Strike, and Pl.'s Additional Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 51, 52 (Docket # 109) (either PRDSMF or PASMF). After Mr. Eaton and Ms. Furrow were seated in the lounge, they ordered a meal and a "volcano bowl," a mixed alcoholic beverage consisting of two kinds of rum, Apple Jack brandy, passion syrup, pineapple juice and orange juice and approximately equal to three drinks. DSMF ¶ 54; PRDSMF ¶ 54. Ms. Furrow tried the volcano bowl but did not like it, and did not drink any more of it. DSMF ¶ 58; PRDSMF ¶ 58. Mr. Eaton, who had consumed two beers at home between noon and 2 or 3 p.m., continued to drink the volcano bowl. DSMF ¶ 55, 59; PRSMF ¶ 55, 59.
During dinner, Mr. Eaton and Ms. Furrow got into an argument, which lasted for about twenty to thirty minutes. DSMF ¶¶ 60, 62; PRDSMF ¶¶ 60, 62. During the argument, Ms. Furrow called Mr. Eaton a "jerk," an "idiot," and a "fucking asshole" in a voice loud enough so that others could hear.
As Mr. Eaton searched the restaurant for Ms. Furrow, Jason Lepper, a deputy with the Hancock County Sheriff's Department, was off-duty with his family at China Hill. DSMF ¶ 68, PRDSMF ¶ 68. Mr. Eaton went in and out of the restaurant a few times. DSMF ¶ 74; PRDSMF ¶ 74. While Deputy Lepper was in the lobby, he saw Mr. Eaton bump into the restaurant doors as he tried to re-enter, stumble back, pull the doors open, and walk inside. DSMF ¶ 76; PRDSMF ¶ 76. As Mr. Eaton entered, Deputy Lepper observed Mr. Eaton stumble, appear unsteady, and he could smell alcohol as Mr. Eaton walked by. DSMF ¶ 78; PRDSMF ¶ 78. A few minutes later, Mr. Eaton came back into the lobby and loudly swore, "This is fucking bullshit." DSMF ¶ 79; PRDSMF ¶ 79. Deputy Lepper, along with a number of other patrons, concluded that Mr. Eaton was intoxicated, and they became concerned that Mr. Eaton might attempt to drive. DSMF ¶ 80, 81, 84, 85; PRDSMF ¶ 80, 81, 84, 85.
Deputy Lepper directed his brother-in-law, Joshua Stevens, and his wife to call the Sheriff's Office or the Police Department to inform them that an intoxicated patron at China Hill might attempt to drive. DSMF ¶ 86; PRDSMF ¶ 86. Mr. Stevens called the Sheriff's Department. DSMF ¶ 87; PRDSMF ¶ 87. As Mr. Eaton walked back into the parking lot, Deputy Lepper tailed him by fifteen or twenty feet. DSMF ¶ 88; PRDSMF ¶ 88. The reason Deputy Lepper followed Mr. Eaton was because he thought he was drunk and might attempt to drive. PSAMF ¶ 1; DRPSAMF ¶ 1. While in the parking lot, Mr. Eaton stumbled around, mumbled, and talked to himself. DSMF ¶ 90; PRDSMF ¶ 90. Deputy Lepper overheard him saying something about his car and his woman. DSMF ¶ 91; PRDSMF ¶ 91.
At this point, their recollections diverge.
During oral argument, a factual question arose as to whether Mr. Eaton was carrying bags with leftovers when he turned and assumed a belligerent stance toward Deputy Lepper. Mr. Eaton's counsel asserted that the summary judgment record confirms that he was holding carryout bags of food when he turned to face Deputy Lepper—a fact that would make his belligerence less intimidating. In support, Mr. Eaton's counsel pointed to the following Delphic statement of material fact:
PSAMF ¶ 48. This statement of material fact appears wholly without context. There is no other mention of bags in Mr. Eaton's additional statement and no mention of carryout bags of Chinese food. Upon first review, the Court did not know what to make of the statement. The Court accepts Mr. Eaton's counsel's contention that there is evidence in this summary judgment record that as he turned to face Deputy Lepper, Mr. Eaton was carrying bags of leftover food.
Deputy Lepper approached Mr. Eaton, grabbed him, and pushed him up against the exterior wall. DSMF ¶ 104; PRDSMF ¶ 104. Mr. Eaton was able to grab onto the door handle and, as Mr. Eaton held onto the handle, Deputy Lepper put Mr. Eaton's right wrist into a wrist lock. PSAMF ¶ 7. While Mr. Eaton was holding onto the door handle, James Lepper, Deputy Lepper's father, pried Mr. Eaton's fingers off the handle. DSMF ¶ 109; PRDSMF ¶ 109. Deputy Lepper and, to a lesser extent, Mr. Stevens had a difficult time wrestling him to the ground. PSAMF ¶ 10. Mr. Eaton was yelling, swearing, and belligerent. DSMF ¶ 103; PRDSMF ¶ 103.
When exactly Deputy Lepper applied enough force to Mr. Eaton's arm to damage his shoulder is very much in dispute. Both parties agree that Deputy Lepper placed one of Mr. Eaton's arms in a wrist lock or arm bar and pulled his arm behind his back for pain compliance. DSMF ¶ 105; PRDSMF ¶ 105; PSAMF ¶ 11. They also agree that Deputy Lepper held Mr. Eaton's arm halfway up his back and threatened to break it when it was near the back of his neck. PSAMF ¶¶ 8, 11, 12. They do not agree, however, precisely when Deputy Lepper applied so much
At oral argument, the Court questioned counsel closely and Plaintiff's counsel referred to the following statement of material fact:
PASMF ¶ 12. Mr. Eaton's counsel insisted that the evidence revealed that Deputy Lepper injured Mr. Eaton's shoulder after he had taken Mr. Eaton to the ground and while he was lying there; in other words, after he had been subdued. Defense counsel vigorously objected, asserting that there was no evidence in the record that Mr. Eaton was on the ground when the Deputy broke his shoulder.
The Court required Plaintiff's counsel to file record references to support this version of the events, which, on its face, did not seem justified by the summary judgment record. On September 17, 2010, Mr. Eaton's counsel filed a series of record references, including Mr. Eaton's testimony, which read in part:
Pl.'s Supp. Oral Argument as Ordered by the Court, Attach. 4, Dep. of Ronald Eaton 36:3-16 (Docket # 150). Based upon this additional record reference, for purposes of summary judgment analysis, the Court accepts that Mr. Eaton's injury was sustained after Mr. Eaton had been wrestled to the ground.
When Deputy Robert Morang of the Hancock County Sheriff's Department arrived, Mr. Eaton was face down on the ground with his hands behind his back. DSMF ¶ 112, PRDSMF ¶ 112. Deputy Morang handcuffed Mr. Eaton and Officer Shawn Willey placed him in an Ellsworth police cruiser and transported him to Hancock County Jail. DSMF ¶ 114; PRDSMF ¶ 114. When Mr. Eaton asked why he was being arrested, Deputy Lepper responded, "because you're being a drunk asshole." PASMF ¶ 19.
Prior to Mr. Eaton's arrival, the jail was alerted that it should be ready for someone who was belligerent, combative, and argumentative; the jail was not told he was injured. DSMF ¶¶ 119, 120; PRDSMF ¶¶ 119, 120. Mr. Eaton arrived at the jail at about 6:18 p.m. DSMF ¶ 121; PRDSMF ¶ 121. Corrections Officers Ryan Haines and Joshua Gunn met Mr. Eaton at the jail's sally port. DSMF ¶ 122; PRDSMF ¶ 122. Mr. Eaton was slow getting out of the police cruiser. DSMF ¶ 127; PRDSMF ¶ 127. He was unstable, slurred his speech, smelled like alcohol, and appeared intoxicated. DSMF ¶¶ 130, 131; PRDSMF ¶¶ 130, 131. He was pat-searched and brought into the jail for booking. DSMF ¶¶ 138, 139; PRDSMF ¶¶ 138, 139.
Deputy Lepper told Officer Willey to charge Mr. Eaton with disorderly conduct and criminal threatening. DSMF ¶ 116;
At some point, Mr. Eaton was strip-searched and as he was strip-searched, he was maced.
He recalls being transferred by a corrections officer to HD2, a different cell. DSMF ¶ 175; PRDSMF ¶ 175. After an unknown amount of time, Mr. Eaton began to feel pain flickering in his arms. DSMF ¶ 176; PRDSMF ¶ 176. Mr. Eaton began banging on the cell door and yelling to get the corrections officers' attention. DSMF ¶ 177; PRDSMF ¶ 177. He was angry that he was there and he kicked the door. DSMF ¶ 178; PRDSMF ¶ 178. Mr. Eaton says he asked for aspirin but was refused, and he banged some more and asked to see a doctor. DSMF ¶¶ 183, 184; PRDSMF ¶¶ 183, 184. Mr. Eaton kept saying that his shoulder hurt and he was told to leave it down and stop using his arm. PRDSMF ¶ 185. Mr. Eaton was told that a Physician's Assistant would be called and Corrections Officer Haines contacted Physician's Assistant Al Blackadar. DSMF ¶¶ 186, 187; PRDSMF ¶¶ 186, 187. Physician's Assistant Blackadar told Corrections Officer Haines to continue to observe Mr. Eaton. PRDSMF ¶ 188. Mr. Eaton asked twice for medical assistance.
Mr. Eaton says at that point, three corrections officers and a man in a camouflage suit came into his cell, maced him, and beat him. DSMF ¶ 191; PRDSMF ¶ 191. Mr. Eaton does not know who these men were, but he thinks they were Corrections Officers Weaver, Gunn, and Haines. DSMF ¶ 192; PRDSMF ¶ 192; PSAMF ¶ 39. Mr. Eaton recalls that, before they maced and kicked him, one of the men said: "You deserve this." PSAMF ¶ 39. They uncuffed him and left him alone in the cell for about an hour and a half. DSMF ¶¶ 194, 195; PRDSMF ¶¶ 194, 195. He was then allowed to change into his own clothes and make a phone call; he met with the bail commissioner and bailed himself out. DSMF ¶ 195; PRDSMF ¶ 195. He left jail about 4 a.m. on November 6, 2006. DSMF ¶ 196; PRDSMF ¶ 196.
Within minutes of Mr. Eaton's release from jail, Mr. Eaton's brother took him to the Maine Coast Memorial Hospital.
The criminal trial against Mr. Eaton took place on September 19, 2007 in Hancock County Superior Court and Justice William Brodrick granted Mr. Eaton's Motion
After the acquittal, Sheriff William Clark told a local newspaper:
PASMF ¶ 28. Sheriff Clark later testified that he did not care what the judge said. PASMF ¶ 30. Sheriff Clark confirmed that there was no separate investigation of Jason Lepper and this incident. PASMF ¶ 33. Captain Carl Dannenberg did not review Mr. Eaton's files, PASMF ¶ 34, and Deputy Lepper never received any counseling, training, or disciplinary or other action by the Sheriff's Department regarding his dealings with Ronald Eaton, PASMF ¶ 24.
A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment in its favor only "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). A fact is material if its resolution "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and the issue is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); accord Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2001). When reviewing the record for a
The proposition undergirding much of Deputy Lepper's objection is that the Magistrate Judge improperly credited two of Mr. Eaton's factual denials:
Def.'s Obj. at 2. This, Deputy Lepper claims, violates Local Rule 56. Id. Further, he says that with the addition of these two "essential facts," Deputy Lepper would be entitled to qualified immunity and his motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Id. The facts are: 1) that Mr. Eaton came up to Deputy Lepper in the China Hill parking lot, grabbed him by his coat, and said "where's my fucking car;" and, 2) that Mr. Eaton tried to take a swing at Josh Stevens, Deputy Lepper's brother-in-law.
Local Rule 56 provides, in part, that a "party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts . . . and shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation. . . ." D. Me. Loc. R. 56(c). "Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted." D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f).
Turning to Mr. Eaton's denial of paragraph 92—his alleged interaction with Deputy Lepper in the China Hill parking lot—Mr. Eaton cited a portion of his deposition which reads:
The Court disagrees. Reading the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Eaton and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, Mr. Eaton is denying that he came up to Deputy Lepper in the China Hill parking lot, grabbed him by the coat, and swore about his car. He says that the first interaction with Deputy Lepper occurred as he was attempting to re-enter China Hill by the side door. If Mr. Eaton does not believe that any previous interaction took place between Deputy Lepper and himself, he can only deny the allegation and point to the encounter to which he does admit. Although Mr. Eaton elsewhere says that he went to the side door in part to avoid Deputy Lepper, it is not altogether surprising that he would seek to avoid someone who had tailed him into the parking lot. Mr. Eaton's admitted avoidance of Deputy Lepper does not require that he also admit to an earlier encounter with the Deputy. The Court concludes that Mr. Eaton's response did not violate Local Rule 56, and credits his denial of the County Defendants' Statement of Material Fact, paragraph 92.
As to the Defendants' objection that the Magistrate Judge should not have credited Mr. Eaton's denial that he had "tried to take a swing at Josh Stevens," the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that an issue of fact remains. DSMF ¶ 93; PRDSMF ¶ 93. Again, the Defendants' objection is premised on their contention that the record citations fail to address whether "there were events that transpired before the physical interaction referred to by Plaintiff" and so "does not place in controversy the fact that Eaton tried to punch Stevens." Def.'s Obj. at 6.
As with the dispute regarding Deputy Lepper's coat, the Plaintiff's denial rests on ambiguous deposition testimony:
PRDSMF ¶ 93 (citing Eaton Dep., at 50:21-51:1). Although the Defendants argue that the record citation does not exclude the possibility that Mr. Eaton previously attempted to punch Mr. Stevens, the Court disagrees. If moments before he was set upon by Deputy Lepper, his father and brother-in-law, Mr. Eaton had tried to punch Mr. Stevens, the altercation at the side door could hardly have come "out of the blue." The Court accepts Mr. Eaton's denial of the County Defendants' Statement of Material Fact, paragraph 93.
The Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Court deny Deputy Lepper's motion for summary judgment on Mr. Eaton's unreasonable arrest claim. Def.'s Obj. at 7-9. The County Defendants first argue that "[o]nce the record is credited with the fact that Eaton grabbed Lepper's coat and took a swing at Josh Stevens," the Court must find probable cause for Mr. Eaton's arrest. Def.'s Obj. at 7. As the Court accepted Mr. Eaton's denial of the parking lot confrontation with Deputy Lepper and Mr. Stevens, this argument fails. See supra Parts II.B.1-2.
The Court next considers whether the arrest was justified even accepting Mr. Eaton's version of events. The analysis on this point turns on whether, at the time Deputy Lepper first attempted to seize Mr. Eaton, there was probable cause such that "the facts and circumstances within [Deputy Lepper's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a crime was being committed.
Excluding the parking lot encounter, under Mr. Eaton's version, it is difficult to understand what crime Mr. Eaton had committed by the time he attempted to re-enter the restaurant. Although later charged with criminal threatening and disorderly conduct, there is scant evidence that, as he approached the side door, he had committed or was about to commit either crime. See Rec. Dec. at 17-18.
The County Defendants strenuously maintain that even accepting Mr. Eaton's version of the events, probable cause existed "once Lepper announced that he was a police officer, ordered Eaton to the ground, and Eaton responded by displaying aggressive body language and advancing on Lepper." Def.'s Obj. at 8 (citing Sheehy, 191 F.3d at 23 (stating that an officer had probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct once she was approached "in a very threatening manner")).
Deputy Lepper criticizes the Magistrate Judge's opinion by saying that she dismissed his motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claim "with a mere wave of the hand." Def.'s Obj. at 10. He claims she erred by failing to discuss Deputy Lepper's qualified immunity and by treating the probable cause issue as determinative of the force issue. Id. at 11.
An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires a showing that "the defendant employed force that was unreasonable under all the circumstances." Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir.2009). "The `reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Reasonableness must be "judged from the real-time perspective of the officer on the scene, rather than the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Its measurement requires "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id.; Morelli, 552 F.3d at 23. While engaging in this inquiry, however, the Court must be mindful that "police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-7, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The Magistrate Judge concluded that "[a]ccepting Eaton's version of events as true, forcing him to the ground would appear an unwarranted act, let alone applying pain compliance severe enough to dislocate his shoulder." Rec. Dec. at 19.
The Court rejects the Defendants' characterization of the Magistrate Judge's analysis and disagrees with the Defendants' conclusion. Application of the Graham v. Connor reasonableness factors to Mr. Eaton's version of the events could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Deputy Lepper used excessive force.
Turning to the Graham analysis, the first two factors—the severity of the crime and the risk to the public—weigh strongly in Mr. Eaton's favor. Again accepting Mr. Eaton's version of the events, he had committed no crime when he was accosted by strangers. Second, although there may have been some risk to the public because Mr. Eaton was intoxicated and upset, see supra n. 16, Mr. Eaton at least to that point, had hurt no one. The problem with the third factor—resisting arrest—is that, accepting Mr. Eaton's version of the events as correct, Deputy Lepper forced his arm to the back of his neck and injured
Deputy Lepper seeks legal shelter under the umbrella of qualified immunity, and objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Court deny his motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity "protects government officials `from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).) Protection is granted even where the officials "mistakenly believe that they are acting in accordance with constitutional mandates," provided the official's belief was reasonable. Medeiros v. Town of Dracut, 21 F.Supp.2d 82, 85-86 (D.Mass.1998) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). Its underlying purpose is to guard against "fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation ... unduly inhibit[ing] officials in the discharge of their duties." Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment involving a qualified immunity defense, the Court's analysis is torn in two directions: for the purposes of summary judgment analysis, giving "absolute deference to the nonmovant's factual assertions," and for the purposes of qualified immunity analysis, giving "deference to the reasonable, if mistaken, actions of the movant." Morelli, 552 F.3d at 18-19. The First Circuit, appreciating the challenges of this bipolar analysis, directed that courts "cabin these standards and keep them logically distinct, first identifying the version of events that best comports with the summary judgment standard and then asking whether, given that set of facts, a reasonable officer should have known that his actions were unlawful." Id. at 19.
Consistent with the First Circuit's directive, this Court gives Mr. Eaton the benefit of any reasonable factual inferences in his favor, and applies those facts to the three-factor test
The Magistrate Judge determined that Deputy Lepper is not entitled to qualified immunity on the unreasonable seizure claim because
Rec. Dec. at 18. In the Court's view, the Magistrate Judge was correct.
The Court has affirmed the Magistrate Judge's decision that Deputy Lepper is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of unreasonable seizure. See supra section II. C; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (listing as factors "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight"). A reasonable jury could find that Deputy Lepper's attempted arrest of Mr. Eaton constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court therefore concludes that Mr. Eaton has satisfied the first factor of the qualified immunity test.
The second factor similarly points in Mr. Eaton's favor. There is a clearly established and long-held right to be free from arrest without probable cause. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) ("Whether [the warrantless] arrest was constitutionally valid depends ... upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it—whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."); Vargas-Badillo v. Diaz-Torres, 114 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1997) ("[C]learly established Fourth Amendment law required that the defendants have probable cause to support [the] warrantless arrest."); Prokey v. Watkins, 942 F.2d 67, 73 (1st Cir.1991) ("Whether ... a reasonable policeman, on the basis of the information known to him, could have believed there was probable cause is a question of law, subject to resolution by the judge not the jury."); Hernandez-Lopez v. Pereira, 380 F.Supp.2d 30, 35 (D.P.R.2005) (denying qualified immunity because the "facts alleged in the complaint ... describe a warrantless arrest without probable cause and the subsequent use of force").
As to the third factor, accepting Mr. Eaton's version, including the lack of probable cause and the manner and extent of his injuries, the Court concludes that a similarly situated, reasonable officer would have understood that, lacking probable cause, wrestling Mr. Eaton to the ground to effect an unjustifiable arrest would violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Deputy Lepper is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity from Mr. Eaton's Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.
The Magistrate Judge determined that Deputy Lepper is not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. Deputy Lepper objects, arguing that Deputy Lepper is entitled to immunity under any of the three factors.
Having concluded that Deputy Lepper is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of excessive force, see supra section
The Court turns to the third factor: whether an officer standing in Deputy Lepper's shoes would have understood that his actions amounted to excessive force proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. The First Circuit has emphasized that an officer's actions are to be given the benefit of the doubt. The standard is that of "the `reasonable officer' and what `could reasonably have been thought lawful' by such an officer, terms suggesting a measure of deference." Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034) (internal citation omitted). In close cases, "a jury does not automatically get to second-guess [an officer's] life and death decisions, even though the plaintiff has an expert and a plausible claim that the situation could better have been handled differently." Id. In cases involving claims of excessive force, "defeating a qualified immunity defense requires a showing of an incremental degree of error—an incommensurate use of force beyond that needed to establish a garden-variety excessive force claim...." Morelli, 552 F.3d at 24. Qualified immunity should only be rejected where "the level of force chosen by the officer cannot in any way, shape, or form be justified under those facts". Id.
Based on Mr. Eaton's version of the events, this case is controlled by Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2 (1st Cir.2007). In Jennings, the First Circuit addressed a factual situation not unlike the one before the Court here: an officer applied an "ankle turn control technique" in which he twisted the plaintiff's ankle and broke it, after the plaintiff had stopped resisting arrest. Id. at 5. Having found that the defendant officer had not satisfied the first two qualified immunity factors, the court turned to the third. The court focused on the officer's increase in force after the plaintiff had ceased resisting, and found that "It is this increased force that an objectively reasonable officer would not have believed was lawful." Id. at 20. On this basis, the officer could not then satisfy the final factor and qualified immunity was denied. Id. The Jennings Court concluded that on these facts, the district court erred in granting a motion for judgment as a matter of a law. Id. at 20-21.
Mr. Eaton has raised a similar factual question as to whether Deputy Lepper applied a pain control technique to Mr. Eaton's arm and severely injured his shoulder after Mr. Eaton had stopped resisting. Mindful of the First Circuit's ruling in Jennings and the factual similarities between that case and Mr. Eaton's version of events, the Court concludes that the Magistrate was correct in denying summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity to the excessive force claim; the reasonable officer could not think it legal, once Mr. Eaton was on the ground and not resisting, to increase the amount of force and lever Mr. Eaton's arm so far behind his neck that he would suffer a near degloving of his rotator cuff.
Mr. Eaton objects to that portion of the Magistrate's Recommended Decision dismissing Hancock County, Hancock County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Clark and
Mr. Eaton's objection is primarily premised on evidence from Dr. Alvin Cohn, an expert in Harriman v. Hancock County, No. CV-08-122-B-W, 2009 WL 2508160, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72668 (D.Me. Aug. 17, 2009), currently on appeal before the First Circuit and involving similar allegations. Offering Dr. Cohn's opinion in this case, Mr. Eaton attempts to buttress his contention that the municipal defendants are liable under a failure to train theory. However, Mr. Eaton never designated Dr. Cohn as an expert in this case, and the fact he did so in another case is irrelevant. The Court is perplexed that Mr. Eaton would consider asking the Court to evaluate the opinions of an expert witness designated in another case but not this one. It will not do so.
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court grant summary judgment to Hancock County, the Hancock County Sheriff's Department, Jail Administrator Dannenberg, and Sheriff Clark on Mr. Eaton's claim of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Eaton objects.
Municipal liability under § 1983, when premised on a municipality's failure to train its employees, may be reduced to a two-factor test. See Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 25-26 (1st Cir.2005). First, the alleged harm to the plaintiff must be the result of a constitutional violation. Id. at 26. Second, the municipality must be responsible for the violation by virtue of some policy or custom. Id. This second, causality consideration requires that 1) the municipal policy or custom have actually caused and been "the moving force" behind the alleged injury, id. at 26, 29 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (1989), that "the identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury"), and 2) that there have been "deliberate indifference" by the municipality such that it "disregarded a known or obvious risk of serious harm from its failure to develop a training program," id. at 26-28. The First Circuit has described the standard for proving deliberate indifference as "exceptionally stringent." Crete v. City of Lowell, 418 F.3d 54, 66 (1st Cir.2005). Proof may come in the form of a pattern of similar violations or, otherwise, by a showing that the constitutional violation was a "plainly obvious consequence" of the failure to train. Id.; Young, 404 F.3d at 30.
Turning to the first factor, the facts, viewed most favorably towards Mr. Eaton, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Eaton's alleged harm was the product of constitutional violations. Mr. Eaton was sprayed multiple times with OC spray—including at times when he was cooperating with the corrections officers; his several requests for aspirin were denied; his requests for a doctor prompted the officers' ridicule; Mr. Eaton was not examined by a doctor, and instead was given a small bag of ice; and most severely, Mr. Eaton was beset upon by four men who entered his cell, kicked him, administered OC spray, handcuffed him, and remarked that "You deserve this." Accepting these allegations as true, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Eaton's Fourth and Fourteen Amendment rights were violated.
As to the second factor, the Magistrate Judge ruled that there is no record evidence that these constitutional harms were the result of a municipal policy or custom. In his objections to the Magistrate
The only facts Mr. Eaton supplies that could conceivably indicate a policy, procedure or custom are that: 1) Jail Administrator Dannenberg is not trained in jail policy and procedure; 2) Administrator Dannenberg did not investigate the incident or discipline the deputies or corrections officers involved in the incident; and, 3) Sheriff Clark indicated his intent to support Deputy Lepper against Mr. Eaton's allegations. The Magistrate Judge considered these facts and concluded that they do not demonstrate a policy, procedure or custom. The Court has made a de novo review of these facts and the entire record, and concludes that the Magistrate was correct in her determination. The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge that Jail Administrator Dannenberg's lack of training in jail policy and procedure and Sheriff Clark's failure to investigate the incident and discipline jail staff were supervisory shortcomings rather than "a policy, custom, or practice of using excessive force against intoxicated, back-talking detainees." Rec. Dec. at 27-8.
Moreover, even if the facts could be viewed as a policy or procedure, summary judgment would nonetheless be appropriate because Mr. Eaton has not demonstrated that any of the municipal defendants displayed the requisite deliberate indifference. Beyond his reliance on Harriman and Ms. Banks' alleged complaint, Mr. Eaton cannot demonstrate a pattern of similar violations. He may therefore only satisfy the deliberate indifference requirement with a showing that the constitutional violations he alleges were a "plainly obvious consequence" of Hancock County's failure to train its employees. See Crete, 418 F.3d at 66; Young, 404 F.3d at 30.
In this respect, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision, which concludes that the
The Magistrate Judge determined that the Court should dismiss Deputy Morang, Officer Hobbs, and Officer Sullivan from Mr. Eaton's civil rights conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rec. Dec. at 26. Objecting to the Magistrate Judge's determination, Mr. Eaton argues that all the corrections officers "conspired to deprive [Mr. Eaton] of his right to recover" from his injuries as "they were all present at the jail on the night ... [and] each had a duty to protect Eaton from harm." Pl.'s Obj. at 10. Mr. Eaton's blanket assertion that each one of the corrections officers at the jail that evening was involved in a cover-up is simply not supported by any evidence. Instead, Mr. Eaton cites Comfort v. Town of Pittsfield, 924 F.Supp. 1219, 1229 (D.Me.1996), for the proposition that summary judgment is inappropriate where there are questions "as to a possible agreement between the officers as to [the] use of force in light of the alleged falsification of police records." (Emphasis in Pl.'s Obj.).
Mr. Eaton's reliance on Comfort is misplaced. In Comfort, a police officer had testified that officers conspired to falsify police reports. By contrast, here there is no evidence that the officers were in Mr. Eaton's presence at the time of the alleged harm, that these officers had any knowledge of the alleged harm, or that they participated in a conspiracy to conceal the alleged harm. The Court agrees with the Magistrate's assessment that,
Rec. Dec. at 26. The motion for summary judgment against the civil rights conspiracy claim is therefore granted to Officer Morgan, Officer Hobbs, and Sgt. Sullivan because Mr. Eaton relies entirely on unsupported speculation and conclusory allegations to support his claim against these Defendants. See Sutliffe, 584 F.3d at 325.
The Court hereby AFFIRMS the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge (Docket #138). The Court
SO ORDERED.
The County Defendants went further and moved to strike each of the Plaintiff's additional facts "because they are, without a single exception, repeated verbatim from Plaintiff's original Statement of Material Facts (Document No. 89)." Defs.' Hancock Cnty., Hancock Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, William Clark, Jason Lepper, Ryan Haines, Heather Sullivan, Joshua Gunn, Crystal Hobbs, Carl Dannenberg, Robert Morang, and John Weaver's Reply Statement of Material Facts (Local Rule 56(d)) at 11-12 (Docket # 128) (DRPSMF). To the extent the County Defendants' objection survives the Magistrate Judge's ruling, the Court DENIES the County Defendants' motion to strike. Mr. Eaton's motion for summary judgment was a separate, dispositive motion and proceeded on a separate track. In fact, the Magistrate Judge addressed Mr. Eaton's motion separately, issued a Recommended Decision on March 17, 2010, Recommended Dec., 2010 WL 1418750 (Docket # 134), and on April 6, 2010, this Court affirmed the Recommended Decision without objection. Order Affirming the Recommended Dec. of the Magistrate Judge, 2010 WL 1427581 (Docket # 137). All of this took place before the Magistrate Judge issued a Recommended Decision on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. What was improper was for the County Defendants to fail to respond to the Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Material Fact and instead to refer the Court to their responses to another Statement of Material Fact in another motion.
